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Abstract
The paper reviews recent research on the impact of an aging population on the distribu-
tion of income. After briey discussing the demographic conditions responsible for population
aging, a short account is given of demographic trends in the industrialized world. In order to
disentangle the many potential channels by which an aging society aects the dispersion of in-
come, several levels of aggregation are distinguished. The paper dierentiates between intra-
and intergenerational issues, between direct and indirect demographic inequality eects, and
between the distribution of current and lifetime income. It emphasizes the critical role of
age-related redistributive tax-transfer systems, like public pension schemes and health care
systems. Sources of distributional policy conicts are identied at both the cross-section level
and the lifetime level of income inequality. The institutional design of intergenerational bur-
den sharing, individual disincentive reactions, shifts in age-income proles related to cohort
size, and politico-economic repercussions are shown to drive the relation between population
aging and income distribution in distinct and partially opposite ways.
Keywords: Income distribution; Population aging; Fiscal-demographic policy conicts; Social
policy design
JEL classication: D31, H55, J18
* Portions of this paper were presented at the Universities of Bonn, Halle, Mannheim, and
Munich, the London School of Economics, the University of Bergen, Tilburg University,
the European Science Foundation Conference \Economics of Aging" in Barcelona, and
the EEA Congress in Prague. I am grateful to the participants for helpful suggestions
and to the German National Science Foundation for nancial support.
NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
\Does an aging society increase inequality?" This question is posed by
policymakers in many industrialized countries today. A main message of the
research presented in this paper is that this question is ill-dened to have any
simple answer.
The general insight into the complexities involved is still neither large nor
undisputed. This is due to the intricate demo-economic causes of changes in
fertility and mortality, the consequences for the nancing of demographically
sensitive public expenditures, and its combined impact on the distribution of
income.
In order to understand at least partially how observed relationships may
have been generated, a highly stylized framework is applied to four separately
treated, though of course related issues: compositional eects, scal and insti-
tutional repercussions, optimizing responses and cohort-size eects, as well as
current versus lifetime incidence.
The nature of a basic problem can be illustrated at the compositional level,
i.e. when holding all economic variables xed. The impact of a changing age
structure on the current distribution of income has been studied by a number
of authors, but the results have been mixed in one important respect: there
is quite a confusion regarding the overall distributional eect of an aging so-
ciety. Here is a rst indication why this may be so. If overall inequality is
decomposed into intra- and intergenerational components it can be shown that
under fairly mild conditions an aging population yields two conicting signals:
the intragenerational component of income dispersion goes down, whereas the
intergenerational component goes up.
Several other problems of drawing rm conclusions about the distributive
role of a shifting age structure are identied. An aging society does not only af-
fect relative population shares, it also changes relative incomes. Regarding the
latter, one important channel is created by public old-age insurance and health-
care systems. The respective budget constraints entail interrelations between
scal and demographic variables, causing an additional, indirect demographic
impact on the distribution. It is shown that fundamental policy decisions re-
sponding to the solvency problems caused by an aging population may induce
contrary demographic inequality eects.
A further obstacle to a meaningful interpretation of the empirical evidence
is caused by politico-economic repercussions. If the current distribution is an
important determinant of reelection strategies, then the fact that an aging so-
ciety changes not only the nancial relations of a state pension scheme (or a
public health-care system) but also the relative number of votes cast by workers
and pensioners, may put conventional conclusions in a dierent light. Factors
like political power distribution enter the stage, alongside population aging and
institutional constraints.
The interactions outlined so far go several steps further when explicitly
considering disincentive reactions of utility-maximizing individuals, the sensi-
tivity of age-specic incomes to the relative sizes of age groups (cohort-size
eects), or even the ndings of the endogenous fertility literature. No general
cross-section result can be given. For future research, this may suggest a closer
demo-economic examination of the life-cycle prole of within-cohort inequality.
What about the lifetime perspective? Contrary to the widely held belief
that the distribution of lifetime income (as opposed to the distribution of current
income) remains largely unaected by changes in the population age structure,
the mechanism of the pension formula as well as optimizing responses { to give
just two forces { lead to demographic distortions also of lifetime inequality.
Thus, the analysis reveals that there is a substantial danger of underrating
the distributional signicance of an aging population. Without a proper under-
standing of the demographic component, however, no normative inferences can
be drawn from changing inequality and no meaningful policy recommendation
can be given. Theoretical and, in particular, intensive empirical research into
the distributive repercussions of an aging society (including a careful collection
of appropriate data) is very much needed.
1. Introduction
\Does an aging society increase inequality?" This question is posed by
policymakers in many industrialized countries today. A main message of the
research presented below is that this question is ill-dened to have any simple
answer.
Though most economists and demographers may have expected the vague-
ness, they nevertheless tend to know little about why they are having this
expectation. The general insight into the demo-economic complexities involved
is still neither large nor undisputed. This is not primarily due to the complex
issue of dening and measuring inequality, but relates to the intricate demo-
economic causes of changes in fertility and mortality, the consequences for the
nancing of demographically sensitive public expenditures, and its combined
impact on the distribution of income.
Any economic variable or decision having an age or life-cycle aspect bears
upon this interrelation. Moreover, numerous demographic variables come into
play.
1
In order to isolate at least some of the most basic eects, the analysis
has to be rather restrictive. Once a few rst results have been established,
further factors may be introduced. Most of the extensions, however, prove
to be analytically untractable. Empirically supported numerical simulations
constitute fairly quickly the only possibility to gain further insight into the
distributive consequences of an aging population. It turns out to be a thorny
path to introduce some transparency to the policy debate.
After a conceptual clarication in the next section, some demographic facts
and projections are presented in Section 3. The question of how an aging society
might aect the dispersion of income will be taken up in Section 4. Using a
highly stylized framework, the many potential interrelations are reduced to four
separately treated, though of course related issues: Compositional eects, scal
and institutional repercussions, optimizing responses and cohort-size eects,
and current versus lifetime incidence. Section 5 concludes.
1
See the general surveys by Lam (1987, 1992), Birdsall (1988), and Pestieau (1989).
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2. Population Growth versus Population Aging
As opposed to the distributive repercussions of an aging population, the
relation between population growth and income distribution constitutes an old
issue in the economics literature. Classical writers like Malthus, Smith, and
Ricardo were concerned with the depressing eect of rapid population growth on
relative wages. Long theoretical debates tackled the question of how population
growth might inuence factor shares, and many empirical eorts have been
undertaken to investigate the conjectured eects.
2
From today's perspective,
this line of research has to overcome two problems before being able to say
something about our focus of interest: the inequality of income. First, the
studies are typically keyed to the distribution among factors of production;
despite considerable research eorts, it is still a long way from shares of factors
to the distribution of income among persons. Secondly, population growth
alters the distribution in two ways: It changes relative wages, at the same time,
however, it changes the composition of the population. The ensuing diculty
of separating pure compositional from real welfare eects is a standard problem
in this area. As will be shown below, it is also of central importance when
considering the distributive implications of an aging population.
From a worldwide perspective, population growth (related to poverty and
hunger) may be considered to be the more pressing issue. In the developed
countries, however, it is population aging that has become a dominant policy
issue.
3
What is the dierence? Doesn't slower population growth imply an older
age structure, thus linking the two concepts in a consistent way? Though there
are demographic constellations where this is true, the alleged relation between
population growth and population aging is not, in general, that simple.
The stable population model has been the main device to gain insight
into the determinants of population aging. Focusing on long-term impacts it
turns out that fertility and mortality have rather divergent eects on the age
composition. Fertility shows a pivoting pattern, having a large positive eect
on the shares of the very young age groups and a declining impact on less
2
The interested reader is referred to the reviews of Rodgers (1978, 1983), Kuznets (1980),
Lee (1987), Lam (1987, 1992), or Heerink (1994).
3
See the large number of NBER-studies in the economics of aging edited by David A.
Wise (e.g., 1994).
2
young age groups, turning to a negative eect from (about) previous mean age
onwards. The impact of mortality on the age structure is more intricate due
to its combined eects on the stable rate of natural increase and the survival
rates, starting with a negative impact on very young age groups that changes
its strength and direction in a non-linear way at higher ages.
4
Thus, whether slower population growth is caused by a decline of fertility
or an increase of mortality makes quite a dierence for the age structure. More-
over, as pointed out by Lam (1986, 1987), once you allow for dierential fertility
rates across income groups, a reduction in the fertility of high-income groups
will have a very dierent eect on age composition and income inequality from
a general fertility decline for all income groups that produces the same change
in the population growth rate. It becomes clear from these observations that
there can be no simple mapping of the population growth rate onto changes in
the age distribution, or vice versa.
A further misunderstanding may also be noted here. Population aging
cannot, in general, be attributed to high or low levels of fertility or mortality.
As long as the demographic regimes have been in place long enough (a span
of two or three generations is typically sucient), the age composition of a
population will be xed whatever levels of fertility or mortality apply. This
classic lesson
5
is overlooked by those who assume that populations with below-
replacement fertility are necessarily aging populations. Persistent deceleration
in the rate of growth of births is required to produce an older population.
By the same token, when discussing the possible age structure impact of
immigration,
6
it is not immigration per se that aects population aging, rather
it is changes in immigration rates. A large inow of younger people will not
aect the rate of population aging, unless it is a new event; but, the disappear-
ance of what had been a persistent inux of younger people will increase the
rate of population aging.
4
See Heerink (1994, Ch. 6) and, for the non-stable case, Preston et al. (1989) for further
details.
5
Euler (1760); Lotka (1907, 1922).
6
This is an important issue, e.g., in Germany; see the interesting paper by Steinmann
(1993).
3
3. Demographic Facts and Projections
In many regions of the world { a notable exception is Africa { the popula-
tions are growing older (United Nations 1985, OECD 1995). Figure 1 depicts
the age structure of the world population in 1990, 2050, and 2100, manifesting
the enormous momentum of overall population development and the implied
expected changes in the shares of all age groups.
7
< Figures 1, 2 and 3 >
The impressive aggregate demographic picture disguises regional dierences
which are large and important for the scal and distributional implications
of an aging society. A stylized representation of the aging process, pointing
at some relation between population growth, population aging, and economic
development, is given in Figure 2. The age pyramid of today's developing coun-
tries is thus characterized by a broad basis (high fertility) and concave anks
(relatively low life expectancy). An increasing life expectancy with no change
in fertility will ll the anks until a triangular form is reached. A continuation
of this process will lead to a bell-shaped age composition. Once fertility starts
declining, as is the case in the industrialized world, the pyramid constricts at
the basis and becomes urn-shaped (low fertility and high life expectancy), as
projected for, e.g., Germany. The prospective shift in the age structure of the
German population constitutes a drastic example indeed of a shrinking and
aging society { see Figure 3.
8
< Tables 1 and 2 >
Tables 1 and 2 present some aggregate indicators for the major seven OECD
countries. All of these countries will experience a rapid aging of the population
during the rst half of the next century. The combined impact of increased
life expectancy and declined fertility will raise the proportion of the population
aged 65 and over from 12.2 percent in 1990 to 19.5 percent in 2030 in the US,
from 11.4 percent (1990) to 20 percent (2030) in Japan, and from 15.5 percent
(1990) to 25.8 percent (2030) in Germany. At the same time, sharp falls are
7
The gure is taken from Birg (1995) and is based on a `medium' projection variant. See
in addition, United Nations (1993) and World Bank (1994).
8
According to Birg and Flothmann (1993, p. 97), allowing for immigration will render
the demographic change in Germany only slightly less dramatic.
4
projected for the share of the working-age population in the course of the next
three decades in Japan, Germany, and Italy, and moderate falls in France, the
United Kingdom, and Canada. Moreover, the labour force itself will also be
aging.
Old-age dependency ratios will climb up to 0.44 (Germany), and elderly
dependency ratios
9
are expected almost to double by around 2030 to 2040
before stabilizing or falling slightly. In Japan, Germany, and France, elderly
dependency ratios are projected to peak at 0.6 and in Italy at over 0.7, while
the peak for the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada will be around
0.4 to 0.5.
10
Note that the prospective change in the ratio of retirees to workers,
a ratio that is closer to the scal problems entailed by the aging process, is even
worse, particularly in Germany where it is expected to approach 1 by 2030.
4. Age Composition and Income Inequality
4.1. Intra- versus Intergenerational Incidence: Compositional Eects
The eects of a changing age structure on the current distribution of in-
come have been studied by a number of authors.
11
The empirical ndings
underline the importance of the demographic shift. However, the results have
been mixed in one important respect: there is quite a confusion regarding the
overall distributional impact of an aging society. The following stylized set-up
gives a rst indication why this may be so.
Consider a population consisting of two groups: workers and pensioners.
Net earnings of worker j, Y
j
, are given by:
9
Here, the working-age population is dened as from age 20 to legislated retirement age
(as opposed to the standard denition of 15 { 64 years).
10
OECD (1995).
11
Lydall (1968) stressed the importance of age composition, but it was the empirical work
of Paglin (1975), not undisputed, that set o a series of studies. See, e.g., Danziger et
al. (1977), Winegarden (1978), Repetto (1978), Blinder (1980), Morley (1981), Schultz
(1981), Mookherjee and Shorrocks (1982), Cowell (1984), Lam (1987, 1992), Formby et
al. (1989), v.Weizsacker (1989), Heerink (1994), Klevmarken (1994), Ermisch (1994),
and Jenkins (1994).
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Yj
= (1  c)A
j
; 0 < c < 1; A
j
> 0; (1)
where c denotes the rate of contributions to the state pension fund
12
and A
j
marks gross earnings of worker j. Pensioner i's retirement income, P
i
, is speci-
ed as:
P
i
= p
A
L
i
; 0 < p < 1; L
i
> 0; (2)
where p is the retirement benet rate, 
A
the average gross earnings of the work-
ing population, and L
i
the pension claim basis for retiree i (which is typically
linked to his earnings history and his number of insurance years). Equation
(2) is based on pension formulas currently used in a number of nations. In
particular, it reects the built-in exibility of state pensions increasing in line
with gross earnings per worker.
To move from the micro level characterized by (1) and (2) to the macro
level, i.e. to the population as a whole and thus to the distribution of individual
incomes, we have to aggregate across all j's and i's. For illustrative purposes,
the present study concentrates on the rst two central moments, indicating per
capita income () and the variance of income (
2
). The latter may be expressed
as:
13

2
= x
2
Y
+ (1  x)
2
P
| {z }
intra
+ x(1  x)(
Y
  
P
)
2
| {z }
inter
: (3)
The distributional inuence of an aging population is captured by x := E=(E+
R) = 1=(1 + ), which is a monotonically decreasing function of the old-age
dependency ratio  := R=E, the ratio of the number of retirees R to the number
of active workers E. The dispersion of income of the total population is thus
decomposed in an intra- and intergenerational component. The impact of an
older age structure is obtained as:
12
For expositional reasons, other redistribution systems are ignored.
13
Note that (3) [or (5)] is based on a moment aggregation over population subgroups,
which is not to be confounded with a moment calculation of the sum of correlated
random variables as met, e.g., in an inequality decomposition by income components
[like (10)]. See Theil (1967, Chapter 4.A), Shorrocks (1980, 1984), or Lam (1986).
6
d
2
d
= (
2
Y
  
2
P
)
dx
d
| {z }
intra eect (<0)
+ (1  2x)(
Y
  
P
)
2
dx
d
| {z }
inter eect (>0)
: (4)
If the number of workers exceeds the number of retirees, i.e. E > R  0 (or
1
2
< x  1), and provided that the variance of net earnings of the working
population is greater than the variance of retirement incomes, i.e. 
2
Y
> 
2
P
{ an empirical constellation met in most industrialized countries { then an
aging society yields two conicting signals: The intragenerational component
of income dispersion goes down, and the intergenerational component goes up.
This constitutes one of the sources of confusion. Others will be identied in the
next sections. The reader may already envisage here the problems of drawing
rm conclusions about the distributive role of a shifting age structure.
Opposing demographic eects of this kind are also revealed by measures
of relative dispersion, i.e. by measures of inequality. In fact, as long as the
specic inequality-indicator at hand is a member of the Generalized Entropy
family
14
and hence, among other things, additively decomposable by population
subgroups, it is possible, in principle, to derive analytical results similar to (4).
From the rst two moments  and 
2
one may determine the squared
coecient of variation V
2
:= 
2
=
2
, for example, which is a member of that
family, and check for the conditions of a well-dened overall sign. From:
V
2
= V
2
intra
+ V
2
inter
; (5)
V
2
intra
= x

2
Y

2
V
2
Y
+ (1  x)

2
P

2
V
2
P
;
V
2
inter
=
x(1  x)

2
(
Y
  
P
)
2
;
it can be shown that E > R and 
Y
 (1 +
1
x
)
P
is a sucient { and in many
cases empirically corroborated { condition for the overall eect to be positive,
14
Cf. Bourguignon (1979), Cowell (1980, 1995), and Shorrocks (1980; 1984). See also
Jenkins (1991).
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i.e. for dV
2
=d > 0.
15
Thus, under fairly weak conditions, aging increases
inequality.
Note that the change in aggregate dispersion is caused by a pure com-
positional eect; all economic variables have been held xed. This has to be
borne in mind when trying to draw any normative inferences from the empirical
evidence.
4.2. Fiscal and Institutional Repercussions: Budget Incidence
There is more to come beyond simple compositional shifts. Indeed, an
aging society does not only aect relative population shares, it also changes
relative incomes. Regarding the latter, one important channel is created by the
demographically sensitive government budget.
In all industrialized countries projected population aging is likely to put
signicant scal pressure on public old-age insurance and health-care systems.
According to a recent OECD study, future demographic changes are indeed
the major source of generational imbalances.
16
Restricting our attention to the
demographic incidence of the pension budget, we may continue our stylized
investigation by stating the standard accounting equation for a pay-as-you-go
nanced state pension scheme:
E
X
j=1
cA
j
=
R
X
i=1
P
i
: (6)
For (6) to hold in light of an aging society, the two principal policy options
are raising the contribution rate, or lowering pension payments. Both kind of
adjustments induce indirect demographic inequality eects which distort the
cross-sectional picture above and beyond the direct impact depicted in the
previous section. These eects may be critical to the conclusions drawn.
15
See v.Weizsacker (1995) for further details.
16
OECD (1995). As for the German economy, featuring one of the most rapid aging
processes in the world, see in particular the profound paper by Borsch-Supan (1994).
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If the pension budget is balanced by a variation of the contribution rate
c, this will be endogenously determined by c
BB
= 
P
=
A
, so that V
2
BB
=
V
2
[; c
BB
()]. The incidence of an increasing population share of retirees is
then captured by:
dV
2
BB
d
=
@V
2
@
| {z }
>0
+
@V
2
@c
BB
| {z }
<0
dc
BB
d
| {z }
>0
| {z }
<0
: (7)
If, on the other hand, the retirement benet rate is adapted, we have p
BB
=
(1=)  (c=
L
) and V
2
BB
= V
2
[; p
BB
()], such that:
dV
2
BB
d
=
@V
2
@
| {z }
>0
+
@V
2
@p
BB
| {z }
<0
dp
BB
d
| {z }
<0
| {z }
>0
> 0: (8)
The additional aging eects in (7) and (8) have opposite signs. Whether the
indirect eect in (7) is strong enough to produce an overall negative sign is
an empirical question.
17
For Germany, e.g., these conditions are clearly met,
i.e. we have dV
2
BB
=d < 0 for a contribution rate adjustment, and dV
2
BB
=d > 0
for a benet rate adjustment.
In other words, fundamental policy decisions responding to the solvency
problems caused by an aging population may induce contrary demographic
inequality eects. Note that, whichever adjustment policy is chosen, the ad-
ditional inequality impact results from a purely scal reaction to disturbances
of budget equilibrium, not from any redistributional reaction to changes in the
personal distribution of incomes. This constitutes another obstacle to a mean-
ingful interpretation of the empirical evidence.
The institutional design of the pension formula decisively drives the rela-
tion between demographics and inequality. This insight oers some intriguing
politico-economic aspects. As long as the question of intergenerational bur-
den division has no well-founded basis, the political need for redistribution, as
17
Precise conditions are given in v.Weizsacker (1995).
9
derived typically from cross-sectional information (adequate longitudinal data
are still missing and, above all, the lifetime view does not seem politically vi-
able as a standard of distributional analysis
18
), is subject to the whim and
will of policymakers, since the empirical inequality picture can be manipulated
in both directions through the continuous transition from a contribution to a
benet rate adjustment. If the current distribution is an important determi-
nant of reelection strategies, then demographic incidence eects like (7) or (8)
may prejudice plans for an overdue old-age insurance reform. Moreover, the
fact that an aging society changes not only the nancial relations of a state
pension scheme (or public health-care system) but also the relative number of
votes cast by workers and pensioners, may put conventional conclusions drawn
from simple accounting equations in a dierent light. Factors like political
power distribution enter the stage, alongside population aging and institutional
constraints.
4.3. Optimizing Responses and Cohort-Size Eects
There is another kind of demographically caused scal repercussion: dis-
incentive reactions of income- or utility-maximizing individuals. Given our
exploratory framework, potential implications for the distribution of income
may be illustrated as follows.
Allowing for optimizing responses makes labour income A
j
an endogenous
variable: A
j
= A
j
(c). Considering the usual case of contribution rate ad-
justment entails in budgetary equilibrium: A
j;BB
= A
j
[c
BB
()], or Y
j;BB
=
[1   c
BB
()]  A
j
[c
BB
()]. Taking into account the institutional dynamics of
retirement incomes [
A
in (2)], we also have P
i;BB
= P
i
[c
BB
()]. Given these
feedbacks, intricate additional demo-economic inequality eects result (for il-
lustrative purposes and to simplify matters, we stick to the variance decompo-
sition):
d
2
BB
d
=


2
Y;BB
  
2
P;BB
+ x
@
2
Y;BB
@c
BB
dc
BB
dx
| {z }
>0
+(1  x)
@
2
P;BB
@c
BB
dc
BB
dx
| {z }
>0

dx
d
|{z}
<0
18
Cf. Barthold (1993).
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+
(1  2x)(
Y;BB
  
P;BB
)
2
+ 2x(1  x)(
Y;BB
  
P;BB
)


@
Y;BB
@c
BB
dc
BB
dx
| {z }
>0
 
@
P;BB
@c
BB
dc
BB
dx
| {z }
>0
| {z }
>0 (for most cases)

dx
d
|{z}
<0
: (9)
Since disincentive reactions involve modications not only of the distribution
of net incomes but also of gross incomes, all moments in (3) are aected. An
aging society ( ") causes c
BB
to rise, which in turn lowers gross and net in-
comes so that the additional terms [as compared to (4)] of the intra- [rst line
of (9)] and intergenerational eects [second and third line of (9)] tend to be neg-
ative. This identies an interesting demographic-scal channel of maximizing
responses which is quite dierent in character and sign from the usual result
in the theory of personal income distribution that optimizing reactions tend to
increase inequality.
19
Another important demographic impact on relative incomes results from
cohort-size eects. A number of empirical investigations have indeed revealed
that individual age-income proles are not independent of the age composition
of the population { apparently because younger and older workers are imperfect
substitutes in production.
20
What does this imply for the overall incidence of
an aging society?
An alteration of individual age-income proles triggered by changes in the
population age structure entails a direct demographic eect on income disper-
sion since aggregation is based on individual life cycles. At the same time,
this eect retroacts upon the micro level by its impact on government budget
equilibrium: Fiscal instruments become functions of the mean slope of individ-
ual income proles as well as functions of demographic variables related to the
working-age distribution; allowing for incentive reactions, this involves modi-
cations not only of the distribution of net incomes but also of gross incomes.
19
See v.Weizsacker [1993 (Chapter IV.2) and 1994] for further details.
20
See, e.g., Freeman (1979), Stapleton and Young (1984), Dooley and Gottschalk (1984),
Berger (1985, 1989), Ben-Porath (1988), Lam (1989), Burtless (1990), Katz and Murphy
(1992), and Klevmarken (1993).
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Thus, demographic shifts again interfere with the process of income formation,
opening up yet another channel of demographic disparity bearings. Except for
highly stylized cases, the additional complexities caused by the sensitivity of
age-specic incomes to the relative sizes of age groups force a resort to numer-
ical simulations.
21
No general cross-section result can be given. For future
research, this suggests a closer demo-economic examination of the life-cycle
prole of within-cohort inequality, i.e. a truly dynamic cohort approach.
22
The interactions outlined above may even go one step further when con-
sidering the ndings of the endogenous fertility literature,
23
rendering the age
structure itself an economically determined variable [!  = (c)]. Conceptu-
ally, this complication undermines any positive or normative conclusion drawn
so far.
4.4. Current versus Lifetime Income Incidence
What about the lifetime perspective? Does this level of aggregation avoid
the demographic interference encountered in the preceding sections?
Contrary to the widely held belief that the distribution of lifetime income
(as opposed to the distribution of current income) remains largely unaected by
changes in the population age structure, the mechanism of the pension formula
as well as optimizing responses by workers and/or the government { to give just
two forces { lead to demographic distortions also of lifetime inequality.
< Figure 4 >
Implementing the lifetime approach requires making some stringent as-
sumptions, of course. Going on from the above descriptive set-up and ig-
noring discounting, lifetime income W of individual j may be expressed as:
21
Cf. v.Weizsacker (1993). It may nevertheless be noted that empirical studies for the U.S.
suggest that labour supply eects associated with uctuations in age composition play
a substantial role for the increase in earnings inequality during the 1980's (though shifts
in labour demand seem to have played an even bigger one) { see Levy and Murnane
(1992), and Danziger and Gottschalk (1993).
22
See in this context the promising work of Deaton and Paxson (1994a, 1994b).
23
See, e.g., Nerlove et al. (1987), Becker (1988) or Becker and Barro (1988). Cf. also the
stimulating work of Lam (1986, 1987, 1992).
12
Wj
= Y
j
+ P
j
, where Y
j
= (1   c)A
j
and P
j
= p
A
+
L
j
(
A
+
indicates aver-
age gross earnings one period up). Again considering the squared coecient of
variation for purposes of illustration, we arrive at:
V
2
W
=

2
W

2
W
= z
2
V
2
Y
+ (1  z)
2
V
2
P
+ 2z(1  z)V
Y
V
P
%
Y P
; (10)
where:
z =
(1  c)
A
(1  c)
A
+ p
A
+

L
;
and %
Y P
(> 0) denotes the correlation coecient of net labour and retirement
incomes. The old-age dependency ratio  { and hence the demographic change
{ enters z via the contribution rate c or the benet rate p, depending on the
prevailing pension formula. Though the direct eect of shifting relative pop-
ulation shares, i.e. the pure compositional eect of an aging society indeed
disappears: dV
2
W
=d = 0, all other demo-economic channels known from the
preceding deliberations survive to the lifetime level: dV
2
W;BB
=d 6= 0.
A nal remark in this context. Changes in the age composition also play a
decisive part in an important inconsistency issue: As mentioned before, due to
scarce empirical information on lifetime income disparity and due to politico-
economic reasons, policy measures designed for achieving a more even distri-
bution of income are typically oriented towards the current distribution. The
crucial question then is whether distributional policy decisions made on this
basis are generally compatible with those which would have been made on the
basis of the distribution of lifetime income (which may be considered as the
normatively superior incidence level). The answer is no, for there can be situa-
tions where a certain policy action successfully reduces current inequality, while
at the same time it alters the allocation plans of optimizing individuals in such
a way that lifetime inequality systematically rises. The main reason for this
inconsistency is to be found in the aggregation function of the population age
structure, assigning to each intra-cohort policy eect (across all income levels)
its relative weight in the aggregate policy impact on current inequality.
24
24
See v.Weizsacker (1994).
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5. Conclusion
The main objective of this paper has been to sketch some of the potential
eects of an aging society on economic inequality. Given the complex nature
of demographic incidence, there seems to be no easy answer to the starting
question: \Does an aging population increase inequality?" Policymakers face
a dicult problem when trying to interpret the empirical evidence. An aging
society produces simultaneous shifts in both population shares and relative
incomes, interacting in numerous intricate ways. The available data today are
too limited within and across generations for a rened multivariate analysis
that could provide the required disentangling information.
To understand at least partially how the observed relationships may have
been generated, a highly stylized framework has been applied for the identica-
tion of some basic demo-economic interactions. The analysis reveals that even
at this level of structural simplicity there is a substantial danger of underrating
the distributional signicance of an aging population. Without a proper under-
standing of the demographic component, however, no normative inferences can
be drawn from changing inequality and no meaningful policy recommendation
can be given. Theoretical and, in particular, intensive empirical research into
the distributive repercussions of an aging society (including a careful collection
of appropriate data) is very much needed.
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